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Summary  findings
In a closed economy, a commodity tax drives a wedge  harmonization could increase internal distortions and
between the producer price and the consumer price. In  reduce welfare, if the new tax structure is inefficient and
open economies, intercountry  differences in commodity  does not meet the country's preferences.
taxation can induce two additional distortions:  Tax rate uniformity does not appear to be the right
* Cross-country differences in consumer marginal  way to maximize welfare if integrating countries are
rates of substitution (which result in an inefficient  different. Some flexibility should be maintained. And
allocation of world  consumption), which arise when  apart from the misallocation of resources, tax rate
countries levy taxes on goods and services consumed  diversity can induce strategic behavior.
within their borders  (the destination principle).  A country's choice of tax rate can be influenced by the
* Cross-country differences in producer marginal rates  choices of others. Countries can race to cut rates to
of transformation  (resulting in an inefficient allocation of  attract foreign consumers or producers - or if they have
world production), vwhich  arise when countries levy taxes  market power, they can increase taxes on imported
on goods and services produced within their borders (the  goods and decrease them on exports. So, externalities
origins principle).  arise: the "usurpation  of the tax base" (in the first
Such distortions can be avoided by harmonizing tax  example) or the "export  of the tax burden"  (in the
rates, ensuring efficiency regardless of the tax principle  second).
adopted. At least, that is the theoretical rationale for  Competition between countries would then lead to
international tax harmonization.  Nash equilibria in the tax-rate-setting game, resulting in
Regionally such harmonization can be justified,  a welfare level inferior to that attainable by cooperation.
because equalities between marginal rates of substitution  In fact, there is some evidence that revenue effects might
and transformation exist between economically  be large for small countries, where the tax structure is
integrated countries. Removing barriers to trade and  often used as a protective device.
factor movement exposes the allocation of resources  If both harmonization and competition can produce
more directly to tax rate differentials.  welfare losses, one solution could be coordination
But gains in production  and consumption efficiency  measures aimed at reducing exploitation  of other
derived from regional harmonization are not great.  member countries through taxation.
Moreover, by reducing international distortions,
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decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA."  This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the international  trade research program
of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. It has produced a number of
methodological innovations in the traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new
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dimensions of regionalism (e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
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In a closed economy,  a commodity  tax drives a wedge  between  the producer  price and
the  consumer price; in  open economies, intercountry differences in  commodity
taxation can  induce at  least  one  of  two  additional distortions: cross  country
differences  in consumer  marginal  rates of substitution,  which result in an inefficient
allocation of world consumption  and arise when countries  levy taxes on goods and
services finally consumed within their borders (destination principle); and cross
country differences  in producer marginal rates of transformation,  which result in an
inefficient allocation of world production and arise when countries levy taxes on
goods and services produced  within their borders (origin principle).  Distortions  can
be avoided  by harmonizing  tax rates, which would ensure efficiency  irrespective  of
the taxation  principle adopted.  International  neutrality  of the tax systems would  then
be  achieved. This  constitutes the  theoretical rationale  for  international tax
harmonization.  At a regional  level, harmonization  can still be justified since  equalities
between marginal rates of substitution  and marginal  rates of transformation,  though
not applying at the global level, will exist between countries which have a high
degree of economic  integration  and where the removal  of barriers  to trade and factor
movement  exposes  the allocation  of resources  more directly  to tax rate differentials.
However, empirical analyses seem to  show that  the  gains  in  production and
consumption  efficiency  deriving  from regional  harmonization  processes  are not large.
Moreover,  though  reducing  international  distortions,  harmonization  could increase  the
internal  ones if the new tax structure is inefficient  and does not meet the country's
preferences,  so that the overall welfare effect might be negative.  In other words, tax
rate uniformity  does not appear the right way of maximizing  welfare if integrating
countries differ  from  each  other; some  degree of  flexibility should then  be
maintained.  However,  apart from the misallocation  of resources,  tax rate diversity  can
induce  strategic  behavior.  In fact, a country's  choice of the tax rate can be influenced
by the choices  of the others:  countries  can engage  in a race to cut down rates in order
to attract  foreign  consumers  or producers  within their borders,  or, if they have market
power,  to increase  taxation on imported goods and decrease  it on the exported  ones.
Externalities  thus arise, and precisely  the "usurpation  of the tax base" in the first caseand the "export of the tax burden" in the second case. Competition between countries
would then lead to Nash equilibria of the tax rate setting game corresponding to  a
welfare level which  is inferior to that  attainable by cooperation. There is,  in fact,
some evidence that revenue effects might be large for small countries and that the tax
structure has  often  been  used  as  a  protective  device.  If both  harmonization  and
competition can result in  welfare losses, a  solution to the problems deriving from
diversities  in taxation can be that of coordination measures aimed at avoiding the
exploitation of other countries by means of taxation. Therefore, in the case of tax base
usurpation, cross border movements of resources due to tax rate differentials and the
downward  spiraling  of  tax  rates  due  to  competition  could  be  mitigated  by  the
imposition  of  a minimum tax rate;  in  the case of economies  with  market  power,
competition will lead to tax rates which are too low on exportables and too high on
importables;  since  this  usually  happens  through  the  adoption  of  either  narrow
definitions of products for taxation purposes or a tax structure which discriminates
according to the quality of the products, a sufficient measure would be that of limiting
the possibilities of narrowly defining products for taxation purposes in the first case
and  harmonization  of the  ad  valorem component  while  leaving  different  sDecific
components of the commodity tax in the second case.Contents
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BibliographyI.  Introduction
All over the world, countries engage in regional integration. This can take the
form  of special trade agreements, free trade zones, closer political cooperation, or
even unification. One of the driving forces  behind this  development has been the
economic benefit associated with regional integration: liberalizing goods and factor
movements,  harmonizing  technological  standards  and  cooperating  on  economic
policies  are generally thought to  enhance  efficiency and  thereby foster  economic
development and global welfare. One of the questions that has arisen in this context is
to what degree fiscal structures - comprising inter alia tax bases, tax rates (on which
the following analysis will concentrate), and the treatment of international flows of
goods and services as well as of capital flows - need to be hannonized  to enjoy the
full benefits of regional integration. This is the main question underlying this paper.
1. Taxation and distortions
In order to address the question of fiscal harmonization, it is useful to recall
some effects of international taxation. In a closed economy, if lump sum instruments
are not available, commodity taxation implies  a departure from the equality of the
marginal rates of substitution and transformation because it drives a wedge between
the  producer  price  and  the  consumer  price.  This  involves  a  welfare  loss  and
constitutes a distortion. If economies are open, differences in taxation across counties
may involve two  additional types of  distortions, which  one  can call  international
distortions.
The first international distortion arises when a tax is levied by a country on all
goods and services produced within its borders; this case corresponds to the origin
principle in international taxation. Origin-based taxes are essentially production taxes.
If countries adopt the origin principle but choose different tax rates, the marginal rates
of transformation will differ across countries, which means that world output is not
5efficiently produced. The second international distortion arises when a tax is levied by
a  country  on  all  goods  and  services  consumed  within  its  borders;  this  case
corresponds  to  the  destination  principle.  Destination  based  taxes  are  essentially
consumption taxes. If all countries adopt the destination principle but apply different
tax rates, marginal rates of substitution will diverge across countries, which means
that  world  consumption  is  not  efficiently  allocated.  The  choice  of  the  taxation
principle affects the treatment of trade flows: under the origin principle exports  are
taxed and imports are tax exempt, and vice-versa under the destination principle.
These concepts will be analyzed in more detail in section II. However, one can
already  see  that  uniformity  of  the  tax  rates  would  eliminate  the  international
distortions.  Uniformity  can  be  obtained  via  harmonization,  i.e.  a  concerted
equalization of tax structures through formal agreements. Uniformity can, however,
also be reached through competition between national fiscal systems. To see this, one
must consider the fiscal interdependence existing between countries.
2. Taxation and externalities
For simplicity, consider a world formed by two countries, home and foreign,
each maximizing a welfare function over the tax rate. Interdependence arises when
the choice of one country affects the welfare of the other. For instance, if the home
country imposes a production tax rate lower than that of the foreign country, it could
attract production facilities. This might well involve a welfare loss for the foreign
country. However, this negative welfare effect for the foreign country is not taken into
account by the home country when making its decision. There is therefore a negative
externality that makes the (Nash) equilibrium - which the countries would reach by
independently maximizing their welfare - inefficient. In fact, both countries would be
better off by internalizing the reciprocal spillover effects.
The negative externality is present even if tax competition leads to  tax rate
uniformity, in the sense that rates are driven down to some common level. This result
would  eliminate international misallocations  as  in  the case  of harmonization,  the
6difference being in the level of the tax rates, which one can expect to be lower in the
case of competition. Even if tax rates are equal, however, countries could improve
their situation by maximizing their welfare jointly, or, in other words, by coordinating
their policies and reaching a cooperative outcome. The cooperative equilibrium set of
tax  rates  need  not  involve  uniformity  if  countries  have  different  preferences.  In
practice, in the case of a negative externality as in the above example, imposing a
limit below  which  countries cannot  set their  tax rates could  suffice as a  welfare
improving measure.
3. The rest of the world
The above reasoning must be modified when one considers that, in the context
of  regional  integration  and  tax  harmonization,  some  countries  are  by  definition
excluded from the whole process. Then, internalization of spillover effects between
union members will still leave externalities to and from the outside countries (the rest
of the world).
Against this background, the paper addresses the following questions: Is tax
harmonization at the regional level supported by theoretical considerations and what
are its empirical effects (section II)? What are the implications of strategic behavior
(section  111)?  Which  form  of  harmonization/coordination  does  one  find  in  actual
experiences (section IV)? Section V draws the conclusions of the analysis, focusing
on the costs of harmonization and the measures that constitute an alternative to tax
rate  uniformity. Some  topics  that deserve further empirical  investigation  are also
indicated.
7II.  Tax harmonization  and efficiency
This  section  analyses  the  distortions  in  resource  allocation  arising  from
international  tax  rate  differentials.  The  presence  of  such  distortions  provides  a
theoretical justification for uniformity of the tax rates.
1. Distortions under the origin and destination principles
In a closed economy, a commodity tax drives a wedge between the producer
price and the consumer price. As outlined in the introduction, in  an open economy
differences in commodity taxation between countries induce two additional types of
distortions:  cross  country differences  in  consumer  marginal  rates  of  substitution
(inefficient  allocation  of  world  consumption);  and  cross  country  differences  in
producer marginal rates of transformation (inefficient allocation of world production).
The consumption distortion is caused by taxes that a country levies on goods
and  services  finally  consumed  within  its  borders,  irrespective  of  the  source  of
production.  This  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  comnmodities are  taxed  under  the
destination principle: the same tax rate applies to imports and domestically produced
substitutes,  while  exports  are  tax  exempt.  To  discuss  the  characteristics  of  the
destination principle, consider an individual consuming an identical product supplied
by home and foreign producers. If td is the tax rate levied according to the destination
principle, consumer prices will be (l+td) times higher than producer prices. Since free
trade in goods and services dictates equalization of after tax prices in each country,
producer prices will be equalized across countries, thus entailing an efficient global
production. To see this, consider a world formed by two countries, home and foreign
(the latter denoted by an  asterisk, *). Call p (p*) the producer price of a tradable
good'.  If both countries adopt the destination principle, taxing imports at the same
rate (td,  td*)  as domestically produced goods and exempting exports, the after price
I In a general equilibrium framework one needs to express prices in terms of an untaxed numeraire.
Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991) take labour (or capital).
8equalization conditions for an individual consuming an  identical good supplied at
home and abroad at constant costs will be:
(1)  p(l+td) = p*(l+td)  (home country)
(2)  p*(l+td*) = p(l+td*)  (foreign country),
which implies p=p*. Since producers are equating this price to the marginal
rate of transformation between any two tradable goods, this rate will be the same in
all countries and world production efficiency is obtained 2. On the consumption side, a
neutrality result is achieved: within each country consumers are indifferent between
purchasing  a  domestically  produced  good  and  purchasing  its  import  substitute.
However, if tax rates differ across countries, the relative consumer price (between any
two  tradable  goods) is  not  equated  across countries  and  the  allocation  of  world
consumption is inefficient.
The production distortion arises  when taxes  are levied by a country on all
goods and services produced within its borders, irrespective of their final destination.
This is taxation according to the origin principle: a country levies the tax on goods
produced within its borders, irrespective of where they will eventually be purchased.
Therefore, exports are taxed and imports are exempted. Then, if to (to*) is the rate
applied to goods produced in the home (foreign) country, free trade will imply
(3)  p(1+t.) = p*(1+t 0*)  (in both countries).
Consumers  are maximizing  utility by equating the  relative consumer price
between any two tradable goods to the marginal rate of substitution between them.
Then,  these  marginal rates  of  substitutions  are equated  across  countries  and  the
allocation of world consumption is efficient. As the destination principle ensures that
consumers in each market are indifferent between domestically produced goods and
imported goods, the origin principle ensures that producers are indifferent between
2 If the price of the tradable good is expressed in terms of labour, world production  efficiency  is
obtained  only  if one assumes  fixed  factor  supplies.
9producing for the home or the foreign market. However, if tax rates differ across
countries, the relative producer prices will differ (t,￿t,*  implies p￿p*)  and world
production is inefficient.
2. Tax harmonization
The previous section has shown that the destination principle implies that: (i)
within  each  country,  consumers  are  indifferent  between  buying  a  domestically
produced  or imported  good  (neutrality result  from  the consumer  standpoint);  (ii)
marginal rates of transformation are equalized across countries (efficiency in global
production); (iii) marginal rates of substitution differ across countries (inefficiency in
global consumption). The origin principle, instead, implies  that:  (i')  producers are
indifferent between local  and foreign markets  (neutrality result from  the producer
standpoint);  (ii')  marginal  rates  of  substitution  are  equalized  across  countries
(efficiency  in  global  consumption);  (iii')  marginal  rates  of  transformation  differ
across  countries  (inefficiency in  global production).  The choice  between  the  two
principles,  therefore,  entails  the  choice  between  production  and  consumption
inefficiencies. 3 4 5
3 As  long  as  the  commodity  tax  is  uniform  on  all  goods  within  a country,  production  and  consumption
inefficiencies do not arise as far as tradable goods are concerned. This can be  seen considering the
consumer price ratio between good x and good y. Under the destination principle, this will be:
Px(  +td)/py(l  +td)
which is equal to the producer price ratio Px/Py-  But  under the  destination principle producer price
ratios are equal across countries:
Px/Py  = Px*IPy*.
Then, it must be true that also consumer price ratios are equal in both countries:
px(I+td)fpy(l+td) = Px/Py  = Px*/Py*  = Px(l+td*)/Py(l+td*).
Therefore no inefficiency arises. A similar reasoning applies to the origin principle (for this analysis
see, for instance, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka, 1991). The way in which this result is usually looked at is
that  of saying that, if all  goods are  traded,  neither tax  principle would produce  inefficiencies if a
uniform tax rate is applied  within each country, even if tax  rates differ  between countries (see, for
instance, Zee, 1995).
4 A related question is that of the equivalence of the origin and destination principles. This question
arises when one analyses the effect of switching from one principle to the other one. The adoption of
the origin principle introduces a wedge between producer prices (which go down by the factor 1/(1+t 0),
where t is the country's  tax rate) and consumer prices (which remain unchanged). The tax does  not
affect the consumer price,  but affects the relative producer price and the composition of production
unless the tax rates within a country are uniform (general origin base). Then, if the distribution of tax
revenues does not affect demand, the patterns of production, consumption and trade will be the same
10The combination of the neutrality results under (i) and (i') and the inefficiency
results under (iii) and (iii'),  respectively, hinge upon the assumption that consumers
cannot cross the border to purchase goods in the country where the after tax price of
the  commodity is  lower  and  producers  cannot  move production  facilities  to  the
country where the after tax price is higher. Relaxing  this assumption destroys the
"neutrality" of the destination principle and of the origin principle in the sense that
economic decisions will be affected by differences in tax rates between countries.
This  sheds light on the preference usually given to the destination principle in the
international practice.  In fact, it  is usually believed that  cross border  mobility of
consumers is by far less important than mobility of production facilities. Therefore, if
consumers do not move, the application of the destination principle is neutral with
respect to consumption decisions between domestic and foreign products and, at the
same time, guarantees an optimal global production 6.
There is, however, a way of avoiding at the same time inefficiency both  in
production and in consumption and cross border movements of resources from high
to  low tax countries. This  way is tax  harmonization, which,  by making tax  rates
across  countries  uniform,  would  ensure  efficiency  irrespective  of  the  taxation
also if the tax rates in the home and in the foreign  country  differ. Since international  prices do not
change,  the tax reduces  the factor  income  by 1/(l+t) - where  t may be different  in the home  and in the
foreign  country  - but since factor supply is supposed  to be inelastic  the pattern  of production  is not
affected.  With  the  destination principle,  consumer  prices are  multiplied by  the  factor  (l+td)  and
producer prices are unaffected. With flexible exchange rates, the rate of exchange towards the rest of
the  world  will fall  by  (1/(l+t))  so  that  after  the  exchange  rate  adjustment consumer  prices  are
unchanged  and  producer  prices  fall  by  the  tax  factor:  the  origin  and  destination  principles  are
equivalent. This is the well known Tinbergen theory, which rests upon the hypotheses of free trade,
absence of transport costs and tariffs, perfectly flexible exchange rates and that the exchange rate is the
ratio of the currency values. The theory also abstracts from cross country differences in factor income
burdens, which may result from different taxes. If factors move across countries in response to these
differentials, production patterns will change and the equivalence result will no longer be obtained.
5 A problem for the equivalence result (see  note 2) arises when some goods are not taxed, as, for
example. in the case of a VAT on consumption but not on investment goods. Then, under the origin
principle the producer relative price between consumption and investments goods will be higher in the
country with the lower VAT rate so that it will overproduce consumption goods, while the partner will
overproduce investment goods (see Sinn, 1990a). Therefore, only with a truly general commodity tax
(e.g., a production tax with uniform tax rate if there are no intermediate commodities or a value added
tax applied to all goods) the origin and the destination principle are equivalent.
6 Note that the destination principle is in line with the GATT provisions.
11principle adopted 7. International neutrality of the tax systems would then be obtained.
This constitutes the theoretical rationale for international tax harmonization.
3. Harmonization  at the regional  level
If harmonization  takes place  only  in  the context  of a  regional  integration
process, with tax differentials abolished between members of the group (the union),
but  maintained  with  the  rest  of  the world,  equalities  between  marginal rates  of
transformation and marginal rates of substitution will not apply at the global level.
Even if  it  does not  ensure  global efficiency,  there  is  still  a  rationale  for
harmonization at a regional level, since it provides neutrality within the union. This is
particularly  important for countries  that  are increasing their  economic  integration
since  the  removal  of  barriers  to  trade  and  factor  movement  exposes  resources
allocation more directly to tax rate differentials. The deeper trade integration is, the
stronger becomes the rationale for tax harmonization; the regional dimension of tax
harmonization  is  thus  a  consequence  of  the  regional  dimension  of  economic
integration.
7 The two principles  will however  differ in the resulting  distribution  of tax revenues,  since exported
goods are taxed  by the exporting  country  under  the origin  principle  and by the importing  country  under
the destination  principle.  Therefore, a positive value of net exports increases  the tax base of the
exporting country under the origin principle and viceversa. The reverse holds under the  destination
principle.
12Box  1:  The  restricted  origin  principle.  In  the  case  of  regional  integration,  a  further
important  principle  in international  taxation  is the restricted  origin principle.  Under  this
principle, trade within the union is taxed according to the origin principle and trade with the
rest  of the  world  according  to the  destination  principle.  This  system  applies among  the
former Soviet Union Republics (and will apply within the European Union in the future).
Shibata (1967) claimed that, under certain conditions, among which the uniformity of the tax
rate within each country and factor immobility, different tax rates among member countries
would not affect the allocation of resources but result in a transfer of real income between
member countries. This can be avoided by the adoption of a common tax rate. These results
were questioned by Whalley (1979), who showed that the absence  of income transfers  is
only possible if trade is bilaterally balanced. The difference between these results is due to
the fact that Shibata uses a two-commodity model, in which trade is necessarily bilaterally
balanced and  therefore  in the  case  of equal  tax rates  no  transfer  occurs. Berglas  (1981)
shows that: (i) the restricted  origin principle is non distortive only if all countries adopt a
uniform  tax  rate  (this  is  necessary  even  if  trade  is  bilaterally  balanced);  (ii)  tax  rate
harmonization is needed to avoid trade deflection;  (iii) even if all members adopt the same
tax rate, there will be a transfer of real income from union countries that have surpluses in
their trade with the rest of the world to union countries which have deficits. These results
derive from a more general model: all three country produce three commodities, 1, 2, 3, and
the direction of trade, assumed to be unaffected by different tax schemes, is the following: A
exports 2 to B and W and imports 1 from B and 3 from W; B exports  1 to A and imports 2
from A and 3 from W; W exports 1 to A, 3 to A and B and imports 2 from A. Flows are not
symmetrical (for instance  because  B is a  small country).  The international price  that  the
union  faces  changes  only  if  excess  demand  changes  (which  does  not  happen  in  our
examples). If each country adopts a production tax system based on the origin principle, the
tax rate will introduce  a wedge between producer (which go  down by the factor  1/(l+t),
where t is the country's  tax rate) and consumer prices (which remain unchanged). The tax
does  not  affect  the  consumer  price,  but  affects  the  relative  producer  price  and  the
composition of production unless the tax rates within a country are uniform (general origin
base).  Then, if  the  distribution  of  tax revenues does  not affect  demand,  the  patterns  of
production, consumption and trade will be the same also if the tax rate in A and in B differ.
13Since international prices do not change, the tax reduces the factor income by 1/(l+t) - where
t may be different  in A  and in B - but since factor  supply is supposed to be inelastic the
pattern  of production  is not affected. With  the  destination principle,  consumer prices are
multiplied by the factor (l+t)  and producer prices are unaffected. With  flexible exchange
rates, the rate of exchange towards the rest of the world will fall by (1/(l+t))  so that after the
exchange rate adjustment consumer prices are unchanged and producer prices fall by the tax
factor. With the restricted origin principle, consumer prices are multiplied by (1+t), where, in
our example, t is the tax rate of country A for all products in country A and the tax rate of
country A for product 1 and 2 and of country B for product 3 in country B, while producer
prices are consumer prices divided by  the factor  1 plus  the country's tax rate. Therefore,
consumer and producer prices are restored to the original situation only if the tax rates in A
and in B are equal. There is also the possibility of trade deflection:  if the tax rate in A  is
lower than in B, it may pay consumers in B to import commodity 3 through A; it may pay
producers in A to export commodity 2 through B to get a larger rebate;  it may even pay to
import commodity 3 through A and re-export it through B. Tax rate harmonization eliminates
trade  deflections;  moreover,  producer  prices  are  the  same  as  in  the  non  tax  case  and
consumer prices are multiplied by (l+t). With flexible exchange rates, the price of the rest of
W's  currency falls by 1/(l+t). This implies that consumer prices do not rise. This is the same
result as under the general origin principle with a uniform tax rate. The restricted origin tax
base transfers real income from union countries that have surpluses in their trade with the
rest of the world to those which have deficits. National income is given here by income to
factors plus tariff  revenues. With the  origin principle,  with respect to the non tariff  case,
income to factors  is reduced by an amount exactly matched by the increase in government
income (under the assumption that this is returned to consumer there is no change). With the
restricted origin principle, there is another element, i.e. the taxation of imports and the rebate
to exports; moreover, tariff revenues are deflated by (1+t). This means that, if trade with rest
of the  world does not change,  there  is a  change  in income given by  minus  the tax  rate
multiplied by the net trade balance evaluated in foreign prices and deflated by (l+t)  (or the
fall  in the exchange rate  if flexible).  An income transfer  is then  needed to return  to the
original position.
14Until  now the  "static" results  obtained  with  tax  harmonization  have been
considered. Another effect stems from the change from different tax rates to uniform
tax rates. A detailed analysis of uniform tax rates for a union in the world economy is
given  in  Dosser  (1967).  For  brevity,  only  the  possible  effects  of  regional  tax
harmonization on production are recalled, since these are often considered to be the
most relevant. The framework is that of two countries, A and B, making arrangements
for tax harmonization that exclude a third country, W,  representing the rest of the
world.
a) The destination principle
If the union adopts the destination principle, and that principle was applied
previously as  well, there is  neither  trade creation nor trade  diversion,  since each
country is buying the product from the cheapest source (however, changes may come
through the consumption side).
b) The origin principle
If the union adopts the origin principle and tax rates are equalized, a common
rate is established on trade flows between the member countries and from these to the
rest of the world, but this rate can differ from the rate on product flows from the rest
of the world to the member countries. One can distinguish three situations:
i)  Neither  A or  B  is  producing prior  to  the  formation  of  the  union.  For
instance, A might be a non producer if its tax rate is lower than that in the rest of the
world (protection) and the excess  of A's  costs over W's  costs  is greater than the
difference between W's  and A's rates (this is an efficient situation); or A might be a
non producer if its tax rate is greater than W's  (antiprotection) and either A's  costs
are larger than W's  (efficient situation) or they are smaller but outweighed by the
difference  in  rates  (inefficient  situation).  The  same  applies  to  B.  After  tax
harmonization, if the tax rate in A was originally higher than in B and it is assumed
15that they harmonize on an average, the tax rate in A decreases. The protection effect
increases and the antiprotection one decreases. A might start production. If A is a
high cost location relative to W, production due to the enhancing of the protection
effect means relocation to the high cost producer; production due to the decrease of
the antiprotection effect means relocation to the low or high cost producer according
to the two cases above distinguished. As for B, the rise in its tax rate increases the
antiprotection  and  decreases  the  protection  effect  of  taxation,  which  implies  no
production relocation in B.
ii) Either A or B producing. If A was the supplier prior to the harmonization,
the same as above applies. If B was the supplier, the equalization of the tax rates
might make A become the supplier (relocation to low cost producer). The rise in B's
tax rate may divert production to W, which can be either production relocation to the
low or high cost producer since the tax rates in B and W differ from each other.
iii) The case of both A and B producing cannot exist here since each country
sells at a unique tax inclusive price wherever the product is sold.
If prior to harnonization  the destination principle was in force, the least cost
producer was supplying all countries. With the formation of the union and the change
to  the  origin  principle,  the  rather  unlikely  best  event  that  can  take  place  is  no
relocation of production, i.e. that the least cost supplier is also the least tax country.
4. The effects of harmonization in practice
The theoretical analysis conducted so far has shown that distortions due to
international tax differentials are a reason for fiscal harmonization. But what is the
importance of these distortions in practice? This is a relevant question since, if these
distortions were small, harmonization would not determine a substantial increase in
welfare  and  the rationale  for  it  would  fail  at  the  empirical  level,  though  being
theoretically clear. An appraisal of the of the welfare effects of tax harmonization can
be found in empirical studies of the European integration process, therefore referring
16to a context of destination-based commodity taxation. These analyses, however, do
not  consider  the  distortions  mentioned  above,  i.e.  the  inefficiency  in  global
consumption deriving from the application of different tax rates in different countries
under the destination principle. Their focus is, instead, on the impediments to the
completion of the "internal market" due to tax differentials, or, in other words, to the
disadvantages that goods produced in one member country face when competing with
domestic products in the markets of other member countries. From this perspective,
tax harmonization can affect welfare through three main channels: the reduction  of
the  costs  connected  to  the  existence  of  frontier  formalities;  the  relocation  of
production; the realization of scale economies in production. Most of the analyses do
not distinguish between the effects of fiscal integration alone and those of economic
integration  in  general.  However,  in  some  cases  one  can  single  out  the  fiscal
integration effects.
1) Effects of the removal of frontier formalities
How important are tax differentials as trade barriers? In  1988, the European
Commission conducted  a survey of 2000 firms on the relevance of barriers in  the
Community market. Entrepreneurs ranked (value added) tax differentials in the fifth
place. The four  most  important barriers  were technical  standards  and regulations,
administrative barriers, frontier formalities, and freight transport regulations. Other
barriers,  less  important  than  VAT  differentials,  were  capital  market  controls,
government  procurement  restrictions  and  implementation  of  Community  law
(European Conmmission,  1988). Destination-based value added tax rate differences, as
well as differences in excise duties, are however linked to the presence of frontier
formalities (ranked third): in  fact, entrepreneurs considered them to  be one  of the
main reasons for the existence of customs formalities. Therefore, one can infer the
cost of tax rate differentials directly from the costs of customs formalities borne on
intra-Community trade. According to estimates of the European Commission (1988),
these costs would range from 8.4-9.3 bn ECU for trade in goods, of which 7.9-8.3 bn
borne by firms and 0.5-1.0 by public authorities. The cost to firms amounted to  1.6-
1.7% of total intra-Community trade and 0.2-0.3% of the Community GDP.
172) Tax differentials and production location
Differences in commodity taxation may distort the location of production.
However, this does not really apply to the European Community integration program
since the value added tax was already levied according to the destination principle
and excise duties were in general paid only in the country of final retail sale.
3) Effects of the realization of scale economies
The destination principle still enables countries to penalize goods generally
supplied by foreign firms. This indirect discrimination through the tax structure does
not distort location decisions or the pattern of costs competitiveness, but contributes
to the segmentation of the internal market and prevents the realization of economies
of scale (Devereaux and  Pearson,  1990). According to  estimates of the European
Commission  (1988),  economies  of  scale  would  entail  a  possible  cost  reduction
ranging from 1 to 63% for industrial plants which, by doubling their size, attain the
optimal level. Smith and Venables (1988a and 1988b) estimate welfare gains from the
realization of scale economies in the range of  1% to 4% of the value of aggregate
consumption before the policy change 8. However, these gains do not derive from tax
harmonization  alone,  and  one  cannot  evaluate  its  specific  contribution  to  the
integration process 9.
Harmonization aimed at eliminating indirect discrimination through the tax
structure also affects consumption. Pearson and Smith (1990) estimate the effects on
household spending in the United Kingdom of the European Commission proposal on
8 These results  are derived  from an assumed  reduction  in the intra-EC  implicit  trade barriers  such that
costs are reduced  by 2.5% of the value  of intra-EC  trade. This figure is supported  on the basis of the
estimates in Pelkmans,  Wallace and Winters (1988), according to which the removal of border
measures  would  generate  cost savings  of between  1%  and 3%  of trade.
9 Overall, the completion of the internal market should increase welfare by 4.5% to 6.5% of GDP in the
medium to long run. This estimate does not consider dynamic effects of the integration process. Tax
harmonization can  contribute  to  these,  for  instance, if  the  removal  of  tax  barriers  induces more
credibility and predictability of tax policies for firms and individuals in terms of reduced uncertainty as
for the evolution of commodity taxes.
18VAT and excise duties harmonization (VAT rates are set within two bands: between
14% and 20% for the standard rate, to be applied to most transactions, and between
4% and 9% for the reduced rate, to be applied to some basic goods and services, such
as food, public transport, domestic energy, and books and newspapers. Excise duties
on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, and mineral oils are set at uniform levels, reflecting the
average of those existing in the member states). For the United Kingdom the proposal
meant  the  introduction  of  taxation  for  otherwise  zero-rated  goods  like  food,
household energy, books and newspapers, children's clothing and a fall in taxation of
alcoholic drinks. Changes in household spending in volume terms were estimated to
be +39% for alcoholic drinks, -3% for food, -12% for petrol, -5% for fuel. Changes in
tax revenues were  also considered  (e.g., tax receipts  from household  spending on
alcoholic drinks were estimated to fall by £ 1.9 bn). These and other effects made the
authors  question the  wisdom  of  the  harmonization  measures.  In  particular,  they
proposed a less drastic solution to indirect protection: restrictions to the possibility of
employing  narrow definitions  of  goods for  tax purposes  in  order  to  discriminate
between domestic and foreign producers. One can justify this position in terms of the
above  analysis:  harmonization  would  reduce  the  international  distortion  in
consumption, but could increase the internal one, if the new tax structure does not
meet the country's preferences and the overall welfare effect might be a loss for the
member country concerned.
III.  Tax harmonization, fiscal interdependence and strategic behavior
The above analysis has not considered that a country's  choice of tax rate can
be influenced by the choices of its partners. Countries can in fact engage in a race to
cut down rates in order to attract foreign consumers or producers within their borders
(usurpation of the tax base), the result being that countries adopt less than optimal
taxes. This section argues that, although coordination is beneficial, harmonization is
not the best way of implementing it.
191. Fiscal interdependence in theory
The previous welfare analysis was based on the assumption that consumers
cannot cross borders to purchase cheaper goods in the country that levies a lower
(destination based) consumption tax rate and that producers cannot cross borders to
locate production facilities in the country with the lower (origin based) production
tax. If one relaxes this assumption, the choice of the tax rate made by one country
influences the choice of the others. For the sake of brevity and to relate to the analysis
of section m, take the case of the European Union proposed clearing house system,
which  would  be  substantially equal  to  a  destination-based  system  without  fiscal
frontiers. In the absence of tax rate uniformity, the removal of border controls entails
problems since non registered tax payers could cross borders to shop in a low tax
member country. This means that the high tax member countries lose part of their tax
bases, which go to the low tax states. The undercutting countries do not take  the
negative effect on the partners' revenues into account when deciding their tax rates.
This negative externality can push countries to engage in strategic responses lowering
tax rates to levels below the desired ones. Competition between member states, then,
would not lead to an optimal outcome: the Nash equilibrium of the tax rate setting
game would  correspond  to  a welfare  level  inferior  to  that  attainable if  countries
behaved in  a  cooperative way. Therefore there  is scope  for some  form  of  policy
coordination. Before seeing whether this should be harmonization, let us look at the
probable magnitude of this negative externality.
2. The importance of externalities in practice
How big could the revenue losses due to cross border shopping be? Cnossen
(1990) notes that these could be relevant for the EC member countries, since nearly
15% of their population lives in border areas. However, mobility of consumers  is
usually considered to be rather low. One distinction should nevertheless be  drawn
between large and small countries: for the latter, revenue effects from cross border
shopping could in principle be  relevant. This  means that, on the one  hand,  small
20countries could choose to undercut larger neighbors, since the increase in the tax base
due to the inflow of foreign consumers can more than compensate for the decrease in
the rate, thus leading to higher revenues. In fact, in 1990 Luxembourg levied VAT at
a standard rate of 12%, undercutting the neighboring Belgium (19%), France (18,6%),
and Germany (14%) (Cnossen, 1990)10.  On the other hand, small countries might find
it difficult to impose higher rates than their neighbors when wishing to do so. One
example is that of Ireland (see Box 2), where cross border shopping to the United
Kingdom seems to have been a phenomenon of some significance and the evolution
of commodity taxation appears in line with the theoretical considerations on fiscal
interdependence.
10  For a model  of tax competition  with  the small  country  undercutting  the larger  one see Kanbur  and
Keen (1993).
21Box 2: Commodity  taxation  and cross border shopping  in Ireland.  Commodity  taxation
in Ireland tends to have been above the OECD and EC average; moreover, it has been higher
than in the neighboring United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). For instance, in  1988 taxes on
goods and services as a percentage of GDP  amounted to  18.5% in Ireland and  8% in the
United Kingdom, in 1990 to 21.6% and 8.0% respectively. By 1990, the number of statutory
VAT tax rates had been cut to three and the standard rate reduced from 25% to 23% and then
to 21% in 1991, against a 17.5% rate in the United Kingdom. The Irish rate was still about 4
percentage  points  above the  EC  average  (in  practice,  exemptions  made  the  pattern  of
effective tax rates on consumption rather differentiated). The following tables illustrate the
evolution of indirect taxation.
Table A: VAT statutory tax rates
Pre  1989  1990  1991  EC
1988  average
Standard rate  25  25  23  21  17
Tourism  10  10  10  10/12.5
Electricity  5  5  10  12.5
Food  0  0  0  0
Source: OECD (1991-1995).
Table B: VAT and excise revenues (in percent  of GNP)
1970  1980  1990  1994
19.1  16.8  15.0  14.5
Source: OECD (1991-1995) and author's calculations.
Table C: VAT and excise revenues as percentage of total revenues
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
VAT revenues/total rev.  .191  .196  .188  .194  .188  .201  .212  .200  .192  .194
Excises revenues/total rev.  .110 .101  .101  .095  .089  .083  .091  .086  .086  .083
Source: IMF (1995) and author's calculations.
22These developments  are connected to the European integration process. In this
respect, a simulation  of the effects of the European  Commission  1987 proposal  on Irish tax
revenues  estimates  a loss in terms of GDP of 3% (Bovenberg  and Horne, 1992).  As for the
magnitude  of cross border shopping,  Fitzgerald,  Quinn and Williams  (1988)  find evidence  of
a relevant volume  of it from the Republic of Ireland to Northern  Ireland for TV sets, spirits
and petrol (apart from the differences  in VAT rates, on March 1st, 1987  the excise  tax for a
TV set amounted  to Irish pounds 49.00 in-Ireland  and was zero in the United Kingdom;  for
spirits, to Irish pounds 19.522 per Liter in Ireland and Irish pounds 17.14 in the United
Kingdom;  for petrol, to Irish pounds  27.37  per Hectoliter  in Ireland  and Irish pounds  21.07  in
the United Kingdom).  Their results also indicate  that the cut in the tax rates on TV sets and
spirits undertaken by Ireland in 1984 resulted in a substantial increase in the volume of
domestic  sales, offsetting  the revenue  losses  due to the lower tax rates (see also Table C).
Summning  up, there is fiscal interdependence between the choices of the tax
rates undertaken by the member states; this takes the form of a negative impact of the
decrease  in  the  tax rate  of  a  country on  the revenue  level  of  the  other(s).  This
externality prevents the competitive process of setting the tax rate to reach an optimal
equilibrium.  Tax  harmonization  would  stop  strategic  games:  countries  could
cooperatively  choose  a  common  tax  rate  above the  one  obtained  in  the  case  of
competition. However, since what one seeks to avoid is a downward spiraling of tax
rates, harmonization is not necessary. What is needed is the setting of a minimum tax
rate. A maximum tax rate is not necessary either, since the country which chooses a
high rate is imposing costs to itself only (in terms of a revenue loss), while the one
which is undercutting is imposing a cost onto the other members.
3. Market  power and tax burden  export
Usurpation of the tax base is not the only kind of externality arising in the
context of international taxation".  As already mentioned, if economies have market
11 For the analysis  of this section  see Rose (1987). Gordon  (1993)  presents  a formal treatment  of the
various types of externalities  arising from decentralized  decisions  in a federal context. This section
23power, they can export the tax burden.  This  happens  if  taxing imports  from  and
exports to another country results in reduced net prices to the other country producers
or increased prices to its consumers (Musgrave, 1983). The feasibility of tax burden
export depends upon the elasticities of demand and  supply of traded goods or, in
other terms, on  the possibility of  affecting world  prices. It  will therefore  be  less
feasible for small countries. If the destination principle applies (and therefore taxes
are consumer taxes), an improvement in the terms of trade and thus in welfare of one
member  country  can  be  obtained  by  subsidizing  the  domestic  consumption  of
exportable goods and taxing the domestic consumption of importable goods. If the
country is large with respect to its trading partners, the latter must accept the rise in
import prices in the first case and the decline in supply prices in the second case 12.
Exploitation of the partners creates scope for strategic reactions: for instance,
the exporting country will exploit  its monopoly power by lowering the tax on (or
subsidizing) the exported good, and the importing country will exploit its monopsony
power by raising the tax rate on it. Coordination would imply higher (lower) tax rates
on  goods  exported  to  (imported  from)  other  member  countries.  In  a  regional
integration context, however, one must also consider the case of goods traded both
with the other member countries and with the rest of the world. If one country tries to
improve its welfare at the expense of its trading partners, it will have to take into
account the price elasticities of all of them. Coordinated maximization of the union
welfare means that only the elasticity of demand in the rest of the world must be taken
into account. This is because it is possible to compensate undesirable price effects by
choosing  appropriate national  tax parameters. Thus,  if the  price elasticity  for  the
considers  the strategic implications  of the phenomenon  already analysed  in section II.4 from the
perspective  of the market  segmentation  effect.
12 Generally  speaking,  if under  the destination  principle  (consumption  tax) the home country  taxes
importables  more  than exportables,  the consumer  relative  price of the former  will increase.  Demand  for
importables  (exportables)  will  fall (rise);  an excess  demand  (supply)  for exportables  (importables)  will
arise  in the world  markets.  As a consequence,  producer  prices  will rise for exportables  and fall for
importables  and the home country  terms of trade will improve  (the  terms of trade  are defined  with
respect  to producer  prices under  the destination  principle).  Under  the origin  principle  (production  tax),
if the home country  taxes  exportables  more  than  importables.  production  will be shifted  away from
exportables  to importables.  An excess  demand  for  exportables  will arise  and the consumer  price of
exportables  will increase.  This  improves  the home country  terms of trade (defined  with  respect  to
consumer  prices under  the origin  principle).
24exported good is relatively high in the union countries and relatively low in the rest of
the world, the producer price will be kept lower in the case of autonomous welfare
maximization  than  in  the  coordinated  case.  This  means  that  taxes  on  exported
commodities would be lower in the coordination case (and conversely for imported
commodities). Of course, it also means that the union can better exploit the rest of the
world.
The European experience has several examples of the use of the tax structure
as a non tariff protective device. Kay and Keen (1987) consider the case of alcohol
and tobacco taxes. In the case of alcoholic drinks, the level of taxation in the EC
member  states  was  clearly  affected by  whether the  country  was  an  importer  or
exporter of wine, beer or spirits. In the case of cigarettes, the choice between specific
and ad valorem taxation depended on whether the country was a supplier of high or
low cost tobacco. Another example is that of taxes on the purchase of cars: just  to
take an example, in 1985 Italy, which specialized in the production of small engine
cars, taxed small engine cars at a 18% VAT rate, while the rate rose to 38% for cars
with engine capacity over 2000 cc.
IV.  Practical issues in regional tax harmonization
This section analyses the choice of the taxation principle in connection to the
kind of union that integrating countries are forming and reviews some experiences of
tax  harmonization.  In  practice,  the  choice  among  the  destination  and  the  origin
principle seems to be guided by the kind of agreements that the countries stipulate. If
they are forming a customs  union, the destination principle is usually preferred; if
they are forming an economic union, the origin principle is proposed.
251. Customs  union and the destination  principle
Countries forming a customs union are usually concerned with avoiding fiscal
discrimination that causes differences in competitiveness; moreover, fiscal autonomy
is  to be  preserved. These  requirements lead to  the application  of  the destination
principle in taxation, i.e. foreign sales are tax exempt and all domestically paid taxes
are reimbursed with taxation taking place in the importing country, including taxes on
the last  exchange  and  a  compensation  corresponding to  the  various  taxes  that  a
similar product of the importing country would have paid in the preceding phases.
This system guarantees the uniformity of taxation for consumers of the same national
market.
Customs unions abolish the economic borders but  not  the fiscal  ones; the
latter operate as an equalisation instrument aimed at eliminating distortions due to the
tax factor. In order to achieve this, however, the destination principle must undergo
two limitations.
a) The first limitation concerns indirect taxation. Taxation in the destination
country assumes the existence of  rebates which  are normally calculated  for large
averages (either because the importance of the taxed good can differ from product to
product or because the productive process can take place in one firm or in more firms
giving rise to a series of taxable exchanges). This causes a difference between the tax
value that is effectively included in the price and the computed one, in which case
hidden export subsidies and protective tariffs arise. Therefore, there is no guarantee
that taxes are completely neutral with respect to international trade. The value added
tax was chosen by the member countries of the European Community to ensure as
much as possible neutrality and uniformity of the tax burden (for a discussion of the
characteristics of the VAT see Tait, 1988)'3.
13 It is sometimes argued that a single stage tax on the last producer or  in any successive exchange
phase would be easier to administer for developing countries. However, the introduction of the VAT in
developing  countries (Korea, Mexico,  Turkey, Colombia, Indonesia,  Malawi) was in most  cases a
success in terms of coverage, revenue and simplicity relative to the existing systems (Newberry and
Stern, 1987). These normally involved cascading, which made it difficult to assess the tax content of
exports  or the amount of tax to impose on imports. Cnossen (1991), however, points out that:  1) in
26b) The second limitation of the destination principle concerns direct taxation,
in particular direct corporate taxes. This issue arose in the 60's,  when France and
Germany disagreed on the choice of the principle of taxation of trade flows. France
had high indirect taxes and low direct taxes relative to Germany. France was therefore
in  favor  of  the  destination  principle  with  border  adjustments.  Germany,  on  the
contrary,  favored  the  origin  principle,  arguing  that  low  indirect  taxes  were
compensated by high direct taxes. Therefore, it would have been unfair to burden
German exports to France with both German high direct taxes and with French high
indirect taxes.  Along the  same line  of  reasoning,  it  has  often been  argued  that
developing countries have an advantage over developed ones, since the prices of their
products incorporate a higher weight of reimbursable indirect taxes relatively to the
non reimbursable direct taxes14. One cannot, however, speak of a distortion, since the
economic structure  and  the  tax  structure  are strictly  connected.1 5 Moreover,  the
computation of the incidence of the income and wealth taxes on the sale price is
practically impossible  since the  same production volume is  compatible with  very
different levels of taxable income. In any case, the shifting onto the price of direct
taxes on firm and corporation income is not as relevant as that of indirect taxes. In a
competitive market, in fact, direct corporate taxes would not be shifted forward and
therefore would not affect neutrality1 6. Sinn (1990b) offers some counterexamples.
spite  of the fact that  rate differentials  should  be kept to a minimum  to ensure  neutrality,  administrative
capacity  may be limited  in developing  countries,  so that other  instruments  are not available  to assist  the
poor, which  makes a case for a more favorable  treatment  of essential  consumer  items, e.g. food; 2)
VAT  can be administered  at most levels  of economic  development,  but, as a broadly  based transaction
tax, it is less than ideal for economies  with a narrow  manufacturing  base and that heavily  depend  on
cross border trade since: a) VAT implementation  requires tax payers willing  to maintain  some basic
accounts and voluntary compliance;  b) the administrative  feasibility can be jeopardized by  the
existence  of an extended,  highly  rate  differentiated,  protectionist  set of excises.
4 However,  also  European  countries  have  usually  had high  levels  of indirect  taxes.
15  In fact, the bulk of revenue of developing countries comes from: domestic taxes on goods and
services (5% of GDP and 30% of revenues); foreign trade taxes, which are mainly import duties (5% of
GDP); income taxes, mainly from corporation tax (6% of GDP). The structure of revenue of developed
countries is instead: 36% of revenues from income taxes, mainly on individuals; 9% from domestic
taxes on goods and services; 9% from social security contributions (Burgess and Stern, 1993).
16  The tax must be non distorsive, i.e. it should hit the quasi-rent and not affect the cost of capital. The
theory is based on the hypothesis that the marginal firm obtains zero profit and is therefore not hit by
the tax. This implies that the number of firms does not change because of the tax, the quantity produced
does not change either and therefore there is no tax shifting. If, instead, the marginal firm is the one
272. Economic unions and the origin principle
As for the choice of the origin principle in the case of the formation of an
economic union, the question is a point of principle: in order to obtain a common
market, tariff abolition does not suffice; it is necessary to abolish all forms of control,
since these always constitute an incentive for introducing distortions. In the presence
of  market  power, however,  under  the  origin principle products  and  incomes  are
transferred abroad with the tax burden they incorporate (an increase in price in the
case of indirect taxation or a cut in income in that of direct taxation). This creates a
distortion of competition. Fiscal borders should then be abolished, it is argued, only if
divergences in taxation are not very relevant.
However,  also the  destination principle can  be  made compatible  with  the
removal of border controls since border tax adjustments can be shifted to books of
account. There is then the alternative method presented by the experience of existing
federal states: the US states and the Canadian provinces, to take two examples, apply
retail taxes and adopt different rates, ranging from the zero rate of Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, New  Hampshire  and  Oregon  to  the  6.5%  of  Minnesota, Nevada  and
Washington in 1991; and from the zero rate of Alberta to the 12% of Newfoundland
in 1989 in Canada (see Rounds, 1992).
3. Experiences oY  tax harmonization
Attempts of tax harmonization have been made in the context of established
economic integration at a regional level (CACM in 1958, LAFTA in 1961, CAEU in
1961, UDEAC in 1964, ASIA in 1964, CARICOM in 1973, ECOWAS in 1975, EC
in  1975, LAIA in  1980 and recently NAFTA). Art.  1 of the treaty establishing the
Mercusor (1991)  considers  the  coordination of  fiscal  policy.  It  has been  argued
(Abreu Bonilla,  1991) that this means the abolishment of fiscal borders and fiscal
harmonization to avoid distortions; adoption of a VAT is suggested.
which obtains a minimum profit and exits the market once this is hit and reduced by the tax, the theory
does not hold.
28The  EC  (now  EU)  is  the  only  agency  that  has  proposed  rules  on  VAT  and
excise  rate  harmonization.  Most  of  the  countries  in  LAIA  and  in  the  Andean  Pact
have  adopted  VAT,  but are still behind  the EU harmonization  process.  However,  Tait
(1988)  argues  that the VAT  will become  the harmonized  form of sales taxation  in the
region.  Some stages  of the EU harmonization  process  are illustrated  in Box 3.
Box 3: The harmonization  process  in the  EU. The original designers of the EC wanted to
overcome the border adjustments linked to the destination principle and considered a future
possibility of levying the VAT  according to the origin principle (EC Commission,  1963).
Then, without identical rates, liabilities would be transferred across borders. A standard rate
was  suggested,  together  with  a  low  and  a  high  rate  of  VAT  and  a  narrowing  of  the
differential between rates - no more than 2.5 percentage range (EC, 1987a). After that, the
Commission proposed only two rates, a standard rate between  14% and 20% and a reduced
one  between  4%  and  9%  (for food,  energy,  water, pharmaceuticals,  books,  newspapers,
passenger transport). It was recommended that states fixed rates in the lower half of the band
for  the reduced  rates (in  1989 the Commission proposed that the standard rate  should be
subject  only to  the  minimum rate  of  14%). Under  a  subsequent  proposal,  sales  among
Community  members  should  be  treated  as  those  within  national  borders  and  frontiers
controls  should be  removed.  Exporting  firms  would  no  longer  obtain  a  tax  rebate  and
importing firms could reclaim  the foreign VAT incorporated  in the price of the imported
good from the exporting country revenue office and pay the home VAT. Each member state
should calculate its total VAT sales and purchases for  the month by  aggregating all VAT
charged and claimed by registered traders. The net position should be calculated with respect
to the EC as a whole. A clearing house would net out the national claims (EC, 1987b). The
system is simple, but can give rise to problems because of the doubts on the accuracy of the
claims involved in so large flows of money. On January Ist.  1993, the Directive 91/680 went
into force.  It provides  for  a  transitional period  in  which  the  VAT  is  still  based  on  the
destination principle, but the monitoring is to be carried out not through physical controls at
the border, but on the basis of a new reporting system of statistics.
29The European integration process has been therefore characterized by proposals on
trade  flows  taxation  which  do  not  necessarily foresee  tax rate  uniformity.  An  empirical
appraisal of these proposals is in Fehr, Rosenberg and Wiegard (1995). On the assumption
that  member  countries  can  exercise  market  power,  these  authors  distinguish  between
international  substitution effects  and  international income  effects of commodity taxation.
International substitution effects (efficiency effects) arise when taxation acts as a second best
substitute for tariffs,  since the home country can influence the terms of trade in its favor by
taxing more heavily importables goods under the destination principle and exportables goods
under the origin principle. International income effects correspond to net tax exports. Net tax
exports arise when the tax revenue accrues to the home country whereas the tax burden is
partially  shifted to the foreign country residents; tax exporting is therefore equivalent to a
transfer from the foreign to the home country. Tables 1 and 2 show the results of simulations
of the impact on welfare of VAT reform in the European Union. Table  1 refers to the case of
the Union moving to a clearing house system (because of the clearing mechanism, net tax
exports are absent). Table 2 refers to the effects of the implementation of the transitional
system.
Table 1: Welfare and revenue effects of the clearing  system
Country  Welfare  Welfare  Vat revenues
(mill. ECU)  (%ofVATr.)  (%ofVatr.)
France  -307  -0.60  -0.97
Belgium-Luxembourg  -22  -0.28  -0.43
Netherlands  -42  -0.36  -0.76
Germany  121  0.28  1.52
Italy  9  0.04  0.83
United Kingdom-Ireland  187  0.65  1.16
Denmark  -106  -1.47  -1.82
EU  -160
Rest of the world  -4
Source: Fehr, Rosenberg and Wiegard (1995).
30The results show an increase in welfare for low tax countries and a decrease  for high tax
ones. This is because under the clearing house system consumers pay the foreign tax when
purchasing  imported  goods,  but  the  revenues  accrue  to  their  home  country  (a  similar
explanation applies to the effects of the transitional system). Note that welfare decreases for
the EC as a whole. This is a consequence of the  increase in the tax rate spread  after the
removal of border tax adjustments.
Table 2: Welfare  and revenue  effects  of the transitional  sstem  (in % of VAT revenues)
Country  Subst. eff.  Net tax exp.  VAT revenues
France  -0.17  -2.03  -2.65
Belgium-Luxembourg  -0.06  1.91  1.66
Netherlands  -0.19  -5.19  -7.10
Germany  0.08  2.02  2.40
Italy  0.04  1.23  1.66
United Kingdom-Ireland  0.39  1.56  2.30
Denmark  -0.30  -1.71  -3.14
Source: Fehr, Rosenberg and Wiegard (1995).
These results show that efficiency losses or gains for the single countries are very small and
are dominated by international redistribution effects 17.
V.  Conclusions
This  section  considers  the costs  of tax harmonization  and  discusses  alternative
fiscal  coordination  measures;  it also  stresses  the need  for further  empirical  research.
17 Bovenberg  and Horne  (1992) analyze  various estimates  of the revenue  effects of the Commission's
1987 proposal  for the approximation  of VAT rates (see section  V, Box 2) and excise  rates (a set of
uniform  excise  rates,  near  the arithmetic  mean  of existing  rates,  was proposed;  in 1989  the Commission
proposed  that for alcoholic  beverages  and tobacco only minimum  rates should be imposed).  See also
Tait  (1988)  for an estimate  of the revenue  effect  of the clearing  house  mechanism.
311. The cost of harmonization
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  in  open  economies  taxation  involves  both
an  internal  and  an  international  distortion.  Tax  harmonization  eliminates  the
international  misallocation  due  to rate  differentials,  but  may  cause  distortions  within
one  or all countries  that could  outweigh  the international  efficiency  gain. The risk that
tax  harmonization  does  not  improve  overall  efficiency  arises  when  taxes  are
harmonized  around  an inefficient  system.  Choosing  the  "right"  system  is all the more
difficult  since  it  is  not  easy  to  measure  the  excess  burden  of  taxation  (Tanzi  and
Bovenberg,  1990).
Moreover,  even  if  one  could  know  the  efficient  tax  system,  this  is  not
necessarily  the  same  for  all  countries.  In general  terms,  taxation  is  used  to  finance
public  expenditure  and  different  countries  might  well  have  different  public
expenditure  needs  and different  available  instruments  to finance  them.  For  instance,
there  might  be  different  preferences  for  public  goods  across  countries;  or the  mix  of
the private  and public  sectors  can be different18 .
Moreover,  even  if  the  amount  of  revenue  to  be  raised  is  the  same,  the
available  taxes  can  be  different.  For  instance,  some  countries  find  it easier  to  raise
revenues  by  indirect  rather  than  direct  taxation' 9. A  theoretical  support  to  the
18 This can be particularly  true if the integrating  countries are at a different level of economic
development.  For instance,  developed  countries  might  be more concerned  with  equity and neutrality,
developing  countries  with tax revenues  and capital flows (See  Faria, 1995). Moreover,  in developed
countries government spends more as  a  percentage of  GDP  - 31,5%  against  25,5% of  developing
countries - and mostly on social security benefits and health, while developing countries spend mainly
for economic services, general public services, defense and education. However, it has been noted that
developing  countries with high public  intervention often deliver  very poor  level  of  infrastructures
(Krueger, 1993). On the other hand, there can be cases of relatively large but efficient public sectors
(an example usually referred to for developed economies is that of Sweden), where a higher level of
taxation can thus be justified.
19 In  fact, the bulk of revenues of  developing countries comes from:  domestic taxes on goods and
services (5% of GDP and 30% of revenues); foreign trade taxes, which are mainly import duties (5% of
GDP);  income  taxes,  mainly  from  corporation  tax  (6%  of  GDP).  The  structure  of  revenues  of
developed countries is instead: 36% of revenues from income taxes, mainly on individuals; 9% from
32argument for different tax rates in different countries comes from the optimal taxation
literature: Wiegard (1980) and Rose (1987) present models in which international tax
coordination aimed at minimizing distortions (both domestic and international) does
not  yield  tax  rate  uniformity  if  the  countries'  characteristics  and,  therefore,  the
parameters in the governments' maximization problem differ.
Similar  arguments apply if one considers taxes on specific goods. Kay and
Keen (1982) study the structure of cigarette taxes in the EC, in particular the balance
between ad valorem and specific elements. If the tobacco industry were characterised
by conditions of perfect competition, there would be no economic reasons for an ad
valorem tax. In fact,  specific and  ad valorem taxation differ in  their effects  only
because there is a range of tobacco products differing in quality, packaging, brand
image, etc. The price of the product reflects all these aspects: the larger the number of
products, the higher the price, because of the costs of branding, advertising, etc.  Ad
valorem taxation induces a reduction in the level  and range of all these elements,
which constitutes  a welfare loss for consumers,  who have  a more limited choice.
Specific taxation would be preferable since it would achieve the same revenue level
without this distortion. But the tobacco industry is characterised by an oligopolistic
structure.  On  the  assumption  that  this  results  in  a  too  large  degree  of  product
differentiation with respect to the optimal one, ad valorem taxation has a corrective
role: it discourages competition through brand differentiation. This is the objective to
be  reached  through  ad  valorem  taxation.  Other  objectives  (revenue, health,  etc.)
should be left to (the more efficient) specific taxation. What are the implications of
this  analysis for  tax  harmonization?  As  for  the  specific  component  of  taxation,
different  countries  may have  different  objectives  and  therefore  the possibility  of
imposing different rates should be granted. As for the ad valorem component, there is
a rationale for harmonizing the rates if  the structures of competition  and product
range should be the same in all countries.
There are also other drawbacks of tax harmonization. First, harmonization de
jure  does not imply harmonization in practice if  countries differ in  their effective
domestic  taxes  on  goods  and  services;  9%  from  social  security  contributions  (Burgess  and  Stern,
1993).
33enforcement of tax laws. Second, harmonization must also consider the benefits from
government expenditure to economic agents, since, for example, subsidies can change
the  actual  effect  of  taxation.  Only  if  the  value  of  the  benefits  of  government
expenditure is the same across countries will uniform tax rates ensure neutrality.
Therefore, tax rate uniformity does not appear to be the way of maximizing
welfare if  integrating countries  differ from each other.  Some degree of  flexibility
should be  maintained.  However, the preceding  sections have shown that  also  tax
diversity has  a price in  terms of  resource misallocation and  of strategic behavior
leading to a downward spiraling of tax rates. A way out of this contrast can be found
considering that what eventually matters in an integration process is that countries
should  not  improve  their  welfare  at  the  expense  of  their  partners  by  means  of
taxation. Thus, national tax systems should be coordinated to reduce exploitation of
other member countries. Therefore, a  complete harmonization  of commodity taxes
does  not  seem  necessary. Which  are  then  coordination  measures  alternative  to
uniformity?
2. Alternative policy measures
Tax rate differences might not survive competition. As mentioned above, this
would lead to Nash equilibria characterized by tax rates which differ from the optimal
ones because of the presence of externalities. In the case of the application  of the
destination principle and in the absence of market power, competition  would work
through cross-border shopping, which pushes countries to undercut their neigbours'
tax  rates.  An  efficiency  improving  coordination  measure  would  then  be  the
imposition of a minimum tax rate.
If economies have market power, competition leads to tax rates which are too
low on exportables and too high on importables. As described above, this can happen
through the adoption of narrow definitions of products for taxation purposes, in such
a way that goods which are mainly imported fall in a category which bears a higher
tax  (and  viceversa  for  goods which  are mainly  exported).  Alternatively,  the  tax
34structure  can discriminate  according to  the quality  of the  products.  Even  though
uniformity of the tax rates across countries and products would eliminate this form of
indirect protection, an alternative, sufficient measure would be  that of  limiting the
possibility  of  narrowly  defining  products  for  tax  purposes  in  the  first  case  and
harmonization of the ad valorem rates while leaving different specific components of
the tax in the second case.
These measures would reduce  or eliminate the use  of tax differences  as a
means of exploiting the partners, while at the same time guaranteeing the degree of
flexibility necessary to respect each country's own objectives.
3. Topics for further research
Finally, one should note that much work is still needed at the empirical level
to appraise the effects of regional tax harmonization/coordination, and in particular to
assess:
1) The  empirical  relevance  of  global  consumption  distortions  under  the
destination principle. In fact, the existing studies on the distortions caused by taxation
differences concentrate on the obstacles to the creation of a single market from the
perspective of the relative position of foreign and domestic producers.  One should
instead also try to evaluate the positive welfare change deriving from the reduction or
elimination of the  international distortion  and compare  it with  the  change in  the
internal distortion due to the change in the tax structure (if prior to harmonization the
country was  implementing  the  "optimal"  tax  system,  this  change  will  involve  a
welfare loss).
2) The relevance of distortions and externalities due to tax rate differentials.
For instance, one could look  at the evolution  of commodity tax rates in  countries
undergoing  trade  liberalization  with  each  other  and  see  whether,  in  the  lack  of
harmonization, they show a (downward) trend which is significantly different from
that observable in countries that are not undergoing an integration process.
353) The effects of  regional harmonization on  the rest  of the world. Among
these, one could, for instance, analyze terms of trade effects. These depend on how
harmonization affects the demand for importables relative to that for exportables in
the member countries. Would the decrease of rates on goods mainly imported from
the rest of the world increase the demand for them and therefore improve the rest of
the world terms of trade?  Some evidence could be found from the case of the EC
removing higher VAT rates for luxury goods or harmonizing excise rates on tobacco,
to a large extent imported from extra-Community countries. Other questions deserves
further empirical  study. For instance, to what extent  would the removal of border
controls for trade among the integrating countries and their retention for that with the
rest of the world divert trade away from outside countries (and possibly make foreign
producers move production facilities into the integrating region)?
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